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I Introduction
Keynes was throughout an international political economist as both an academic scholar and a
political statesman, from his maiden book, Indian Currency and Finance(1914), to his posthumous
article, "The Balance of Payments in the United States"(1946). Recently, some reexaminations of
the aspect of Keynes's international political economist has been carried out}
If we try to pay attention to this aspect of Keynes, we should bear the following Schumpeter's
passages in mind: "It cannot be emphasized too strongly that Keynes's advice was in the fIrst
instance always English advice, born of English problems even where addressed to other nations.
Barring some ofhis artistic tastes, he was surpassingly insular, in philosophy, but nowhere so much
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as in economics. And, he was fervently patriotic.... [P]ratical Keynesianism is a seedling which
cannot be transplanted into foreign soil : it dies there and become poisonous before it dies. But.. .left
in English soil, this seedling is a healthy thing and promises both fruit and shade".2 Hinted in this
extract, we cannot ignore his inclination toward the patriotic and nationalistic attitude reflected by
British interests when we study his works as an international political economist.
In this paper, Keynes's contribution on the formation of postwar international economic order,
especially the Keynes plan for an International Clearing Union (lCU) as compared with the White
plan for an International Stabilization Fund (lSF), is reconsidered within the context concerning
Schumpeter's framework. As R.F. Mikesell, who worked under H.D. White as an economist in the
Division of Monetary Research in the U.S. Treasury Department, reviews in retrospect, "[i]t is
doubtful that Keynes' plan would have played such an important role in the debates in the absence
of his considerable international prestige".3 The purpose of this paper is to put Keynes's text in the
historical context and to review it not as the general theory but as a special theory.
This paper will proceeds as follows. Section n argues that one of the origins of the idea about
the leu was derived from the Germany currency plan by Dr. Schacht and Dr. Funk, and then
considers the meaning of multilateral clearing in the Keynes plan. Next, we are concerned with two
Anglo-American controversies in Section ill : the flIst one on the proposal for the "monetisation
of Unitas" after the publication of both the Keynes and White plans : the second one on the
interpretation of "convertibility" in the provision ofAgreement of the International Monetary Fund
(lMF) after the Bretton Woods Conference. Section N examines where the Keynes plan,
especially its intention of realizing symmetry in the adjustment of balance of payments, should be
placed in the theory of the "rule versus discretion" in monetary policy. Some concluding remarks
are stated in Section V.
n Meaning of Multilateral Payments in the Keynes Plan
( i ) Origins of the Keynes Plan
The Keynes plan for an leU was first drafted on 8 September 1941, revised several times for a
year and a half, and fmally presented to Parliament as a White Paper by the British chancellor of
the Exchequer on 7 April 1943. In the provision of its fmal version called the "Proposals for an
International Clearing Union", we happen to encounter the following passages:
The particular proposal set forth below lay no claim to originality. They are an attempt to
2 Schumpeter(l946, pp.505-6).
3 Mikesell (1994, p.12).
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reduce to practical shape certain general ideas belonging to the contemporary climate of
economic opinion, which have been given publicity in recent months by writers of several
different nationalities.4
Can we infer about who were included in "writers of several different nationalities"? These
passages fIrst appeared in the fIfth draft of the lCU(CW, 25, p.170), dated on 3 August 1942,
revised through August, and fIrst send to the Americans on 28 August. Considering that Keynes
investigated the draft of the White plan in detail and estimated it highly in some respects just before
he prepared the fIfth draft (ibid., p.158-68), it would be no doubt that one of "writers of several
different nationalities" was H.D. White.5
Another inference about such writers is E.F. Schumacher. Although the Schumacher plan was
published in May 1943 immediately after the Keynes plan were published in April, it has been in
private circulation since November 1942.6 Although Moggridge insists that "there is no record of
Keynes's comments on the [Schumacher] proposal and no indication that it influenced the
development of Keynes's ideas" (ibid., p.2l), the daughter of Schumacher, Barbara Wood,
recorded in hers father's biography that Keynes gave his impression of Schumacher proposal to Sir
Wilfred Eady. Indeed it may be recognized that Schumacher plan bears some resemblance to the
Keynes plan at any rate, but it remains an unsettled question how his plan influenced the
development of the Keynes plan.7
4 Horsefield (1969, Vol.3, p.2l), italics mine.
5 Keynes, ofcourse, the draft of the White plan criticized in another respects. We will point out his
critics about the White plan in the next section.
6 Schumacher (1943, p.l50).
7 The Schumacher plan, called "Pooling Clearing", was summarized as follows: ( i ) every country
sets up an independent agency called the National Clearing Fund (NCF), which receive its own
national currency from the home importers and disburses its own national currency to the home
exporters: ( ii ) theNCF of deficit countries would be left with a balance of cash in hand and
should use such cash by purchasing Treasury bills on the one hand, and the NCF of surplus
countries would be in need of cash and should raise such cash by selling Treasury bills on the other
hand: (iii) every country agrees to set up an clearing house called International Clearing Office
(lCO) as Trustee in the pooling of uncleared balances: (iv) all cash balances accumulating in the
NCF of the deficit countries are deemed to be taken over by thelCa on the one hand, and the NCF
of the surplus countries are deemed to own each a share in the lCO.on the other hand.
In this way, every national currency is made into a world currency, whereby the creation of a
new international currency becomes unnecessary. It is important that the holding·of surpluses, not
being convertible into gold or interest-earning investment, becomes unprofitable and risky because
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More importantly, many sources and studies show that the ideas of the roc were derived from
the German originators, Dr. Schacht and Dr. Funk.8 After the spring and early summer of 1932 the
German monetary authorities negotiated a series of bilateral exchange clearing agreements with
Germany's trading partners.9 The "New Plan", which Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, the German Economic
Minister and President of the Reichsbank, announced on 24 September 1934, was not a new system
but a compilation of German exchange controls. lO However, there remained a problem of
multilaterally clearing of bilaterally unsettled balances. The "New Order", which Dr. Walter Funk,
the German Economic Minister and President of the Reichsbank, announced on 25 July 1940, was
a resolution to the above problem by establishing a multilateral clearing system with Berlin as the
central clearing-house for European payments. The reichsmark would be the international currency
within the German-controlled area but the national currencies of the different countries would be
remain. Their national currencies will be stabilized in relation to reichsmark which would remain
stable in relation to gold or the U.S. dollar. ll Mark balances in the German-Danish clearing
account, for example, could also be used to settled Swedish claims. Dr. Funk insisted that this
currency scheme would be entirely divorced from gold and adopted from the doctrine of
nominalism by Knapp who said that "the currency does not depend for its value upon its gold cover,
but on the value which the State gives it".12 Currency scheme under "New Order" was the fIrst
practical plans for a postwar monetary and economic order. 13
the Pool's assets always the weakest currency in the world. If the surpluses are made unattractive
and potential surplus countries are discourage from achieving a surplus, they are obliged to speed
up imports by an expansionist internal policy. In this sense, such plan is said to attempt to throw the
the burden of adjustment primarily on the shoulder of the surplus countries (Schumacher,1943,
pp.157-8). This Schumacher plan is a kind of the game of the old maid in which the surplus,
denominated by the weakest currency, would be a joker every surplus countries wanted to part
with.
8 See, for example, van Dormael (1976, ch.l), Luck (1985) and Flanders (1989, pp.198-201). The
Schacht pain which Luck made public in his paper has no relation to the Keynes plan for an ICU
directly, because it is a proposal that Schacht submitted to the Young Committee in 1929-30 to
resolve the German reparation payments and reinforce the future Bank for International Settlement
(BIS).
9 Child (1958, p.38).
10 ibid., p.133.
11 Einzich (1941, p.2).
12 Guillebaud (1940, p.456).
13 van Dormael (1978, p.5).
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In November 1940 Keynes was asked by Harold Nicolson, the Minister of Information, to
prepare a cOWlterproposal for German propaganda of "New Order" . Keynes replied to this
request:
In my opinion about three-quarters of passages quoted from the German broadcasts would be
quite excellent if the name·of Great Britain were substituted for German or the Axis, as the
case may be. If Funk's plan is taken at its face value, it is excellent and just what we
ourselves ought to be thinking ofdoing.(ibid., p.2, italics mine)
In a memorandum entitled the "Proposal to COWlter the German 'New Order'" dated on 25
December 1940, circulated on 1 December, Keynes.expressed a certain sympathy with the German
proposal based on Schachatian bilateralism. In the memorandum he says : "After the last war
laissez-faire in foreign exchange led to chaos. Tariffs offers no escape from this. But in Germany
Schacht and Funk were by force ofnecessity to evolve something better. In practice they have
used their new system to the detriment oftheir neighbours. But the underlying idea is sound and
good" (ibid., p.8-9, italics mine). He goes on to say: "The most definite of the German plans, so
far, is currency scheme of Dr. Funk... It has only one merit, namely that it avoids some of abuse of
the old laissez-faire international currency arrangement, whereby a COWltry could de bankrupted,
not because it lacked exportable goods, but merely because it lacked gold... The arrangement we
are now slowly perfecting, by which international exchange returns to what it always should have
been, namely a means for trading goods against goods, will outlast the war" (ibid., p.12). Similar
point was repeated in his fIrst draft of the ICU, about ten months later:
...Dr. Schacht stumbled in desperation on something new which had in it "the germs of a good
technical idea. This idea was to cut the knot by discarding the use of a currency having
international validity and substitute for it amoWlted to barter, not indeed between individuals,
but between different economic units... [T]he fact that this method was used in service ofevil
must not blind us to itspossible technical advantage in service ofa good cause... I expoWld
in a separate paper a possible means of still retaining a currency having an unrestricted
international validity. But the alternative to this is surely not a return to the currency
disorders the epoch between the wars, mitigated and temporarilypostponed by some liberal
Red Cross work by the United States, but a refinement and improvement of Shachtian
device. (ibid., p.23-4, italics mine)
As these quotations show, it is not surprising that Keynes regarded the techniques of German
exchange control created by Schacht and Funk as a prototype of postwar international monetary
system, even though the purpose of this currency scheme for enlarging German-controlled cOWlties
was to be politically blamed. The early drafts of the Clearing Union seem to be influenced by such
a Germany currency scheme in some respects.
182
( ii ) Multilateral Clearing with Exchange Controls
The ICU is .based upon the "banking principle" whose assets are its reserves and loans to the
central banks of member countries and whose liabilities the deposits of central banks. The deposits,
called "Bancor", is a new international currency created by the ICU. Each country is given a quota
and allowed overdrafts according to this quota. The multilateral clearing is attained by the transfer
of Bancor, in which the surplus countries have a credit balance with the ruc and deficit countries
have a debit balance. In other words, the imbalance of the balance-of·payments is reflected in the
accounts of the ICU as overdrafts for the debtors and positive balances for the creditors. Such
multilateral clearing system has been thought that the Keynes plan for an ICU made a favorable
comparison with the White plan for an ISF. As the ISF has no multilateral clearing system and
"Unitas", a new international currency created by the ISF, is only an unit account.
However, we should not overlook that the multilateral clearing of the ICU is not through the
competitive exchange market but between central banks monopolizing all exchange transactions. In
his fITst draft of the Clearing Union, Keynes stipulated this as follows:
Within any member-country or currency unit the provision of foreign exchange to be
concentrated in the hand of its central bank which would deal with the public through the
usual banks... Internationally all transactions [should] be cleared between central banks,
operating on their accounts with an International Clearing Bank (CW, 25, pp.33-4).
Similarly, in his second draft, Keynes repeats this stipulation:
Within any state (or group of states), which is a member of the Union, the provision of
foreign exchange for remittance either to member or non-member states will be
concentrated in the hands of its central bank which would deal with the public through the
usual banks.... The balances due to or from any foreign state will be cleared between the
central banks concerned, operating on their accounts with the Clearing Bank (ibid., p.61).
After pointing out that Keynes "envisaged multilateralising centralized exchange dealings within
the context of exchange controls and payments agreements", Moggridge continues that such a
system of "all international payments being channeled through central banks with imbalances being
multilateralised through an international institution ... ruled out the post-1945 norm in which
commercial banks effect international payments through competitive exchange markets and leave
central banks and exchange funds as residual buyers and sellers to the degree necessary to maintain
the agreed or desired pattern of exchange rates".14 The Keyne plan for an ICU influenced by the
Gennan currency scheme was against "the post-1945 nonn " based on private exchange
transactions through competitive exchange markets. As indicated in the next section, Keynes
continued to persist in his ideas of the anti·post-1945 nonn ,hoping to recover his lost position
14 Moggridge (1986, pp.59·60), italics mine. See also Moggridge (1992, p.673).
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after the publication of both the Keynes and White plan and even after the Bretton Woods
Conference.
ill Anglo-American Controversy on Multilateral Payments
( i )Keynes vs. White Controversy on Monetisation of Unitas
After both Keynes and White plans were published, Keynes thought that many differences in
both plans would converge on the White plan. Rather he feared that the Americans would go back
into isolationism as they had used before and withdrew from the collaboration that tried to
constitute postwar international economic order. I5 As Presnnell points out, the most important
"Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy" between the publication of both plans in April 1943 and the Bretton
Woods Conference in July 1944 was the Washington talks between September-October 1943.16
The British delegation was led by Richard Law, then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at
Foreign Office, but the head of the Law Mission was eventually Keynes as one of the Treasury
members. In these Washington talks, the authors of the ICU and the ISF confronted one another
dir 1 17ecty.
The British War Cabinet left five instructions to the delegation: (i) members should maintain
the freedom to alter its own exchange rate: (ii) the Fund quota should be larger than what the
Americans had proposed: (iii) gold subscription to the Fund should be limited to 12 1/2 per cent of
each nation's quota: (iv) any attempt to deal with abnormal war balances should not be part of the
scheme: (v) the Fund should be "passive" in the exchange market and not buy or sell national
currencies. I8 In this section, we will examine only the fIfth instruction, namely, the proposal for
monetisation of Unitas, because it is thought to be closely related to the recovering his lost position
of the Keynes plan.
15 Immediately after the publication of both plans, Keynes wrote in a letter to Sir Frederick Phillips,
represented the British Treasury in U.S., that what "we were in a sense propagating for the Harry
White plan...was no harm". He continued: "The real risk is that there will be no plan at all and that
[the U.S.] Congress will run away from their own proposal. No harm, therefore, at least so it seems
to me, if the Americans work up a certain amount ofpatriotic fervour for their own version. Much
can be done in detail hereafter to improve it. The great thing at this stage that they should get
thoroughly committed to there being some plan" (CW, 25, p.242).
16 Pressnnell (1986, p.116). See also Horsefield (1969, Vol. 1, p.60) and Mikesell (1994, pp24-30).
17 Harrod (1951, p.555).
18 CW,25,p.338. See also Moggridge (1992, pp.723-4).
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As Keynes criticize the White plan for forgetting all about "the useful concept of bank
money"(CW,25,p.159), Unitas in the ISF plays a roll only as an unit of account in comparison with
Bancor in the ICU as a medium of exchange and reserve currency. Also, as Keynes ridicule it, the
ISF is ~~a mixed bag of currencies" (ibid., p.308).
The April 1943 and early drafts of the White plan provided that the ISF might sell to member A
the currency of member B only if A had an adverse balance of payments with B. This meant,
however, that the ISF failed to provide for multilateral clearing. This problem had been resolved in
July by amending the relevant clause to read "to meet an adverse balance of payments
predominantly on current account with any member country ", so that it was possible for A to
require the currency of B to settle an adverse balance of payments with C, even though its balance
of payments with B was favorable. 19 In the same draft, however, another disturbing provision was
introduced: the currency purchased by the ISF had to be "in good standing". Keynes objected to
this provision as follows:
[The Fund] would exercise its discretion whether or not to accept or to supply particular
currencies. It would purchase only those currencies which it decided (on no clear criterion)
to be ~in good standing', and (also on no clear criterion) the sale of which ~is required to
meet an adverse balance of payments predominantly on current account with any member
country'. (ibid., p.318)
If the ISF, for example, would judge sterling to be not 'in good standing' at its discretion, the
U.K. was obliged to lose the qualification which draws any currency from the fund in exchange for
the sterling. As PreslUlell point out, Keynes "feared that the alternative of a 'a mixed bag of
currencies' would permit discrimination against a particular currency, specifically against sterling,
and hence, the sterling area, thereby reducing instead of increasing liquidity".20 Because the ISF as
"a mixed bag of currencies" would be "a dealer in currencies" which receive the strong currencies
in exchange for the weaker in order to maintain the quality of its portfolio, it would become
"active" in management whatever its intention of remaining "passive".21
The proposal for monetisation of Unitas was to make Unitas "bank money" and introduce the
principle of "passivity" to the ISF.22 Keynes proposed:
The Fund must not deal in a mixed bag of currencies but only in unitas, which will not be
redeemable in gold and holdings ofwhich will be acquired by members in exchange for their
subscriptions and transferred between them by entries in the Fund's books... This condition
19 Horsefield (1969, Vol.1, p.59).
20 Presnnell (1986, p.122).
21 ibid.,p.140.
22 Harrod (1951, pp.562-3).
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means that, in return for their initial subscription in terms of gold and securities, members
would be credited with corresponding mounts of unitas on the books of Fund which would
free to transfer to one another in exchange for needed foreign currency. Thus the Fund would
become passive so far as exchange dealings are concerned, just as the C.U. would be passive.
(ibid., pp.317-8)
The British delegation formally submitted the proposal for monetisation of Unitas to the
Americans in the Washington talks on 21 September. In the memorandum send to H.D. White,
Keynes proposed that a member should receive in return for subscription to the Fund a
corresponding balance expressed in Unitas, that a member should undertake to sell its currency to
another member and to buy it from another member in exchange for a transfer of Unitas at parity
on the books of the Fund, and that the maximum commitment for a member to receive Unitas
should be limited up to 120 per cent of its quota (ibid.,pp.342-3). Monetisation of Unitas was to
make the .lSF the clearing house through Unitas, and so, eventually to realize the Keynes plan
which make the the lCU the clearing house through Bancor, even though remaining the
subscription principle.
This proposal was opposed by American delegates because the effect of this proposal would be
the same as that of Keynes plan itself, namely to expand the U.S. commitment beyond its
contribution. Although they agreed that the Fund should be passive, they insisted that the real effect
of transactions between the Fund and the central bank would be the same whether Unitas was used
or not.23 By the end of Washington talks Keynes and other British officials was persuaded that
there was no fundamental difference between the formulation of the Fund with and without Unitas.
In consequence of a compromise that the Americans accepted the principle of passivity and the
British withdrew the proposal for monetisation of Unitas, the negotiation resulted in the omission
from the Joint Statement, appeared on 22 April 1944, of the word "Unitas" as well as "in good
standing". Keynes prefaced the following explanatory notes with the Joint Statement:
Under the Clearing Union. the memeber countries might have been said· to bank with the
Union with which they were to keep balances or run overdrafts. Under the International
Monetary Fund, on the other hand, the Fund maybe said to bank with the member countries,
which undertake to grant to the Fund facilities to hold and to draw on their local funds...
These two arrangements represent alternative technical set-ups, capable of performing
precisely the same functions... As a consequence of this, it is no longer necessary to
introduce a new international unit, whether bancor or unitas, since it is only if the member
countries bank with the Fund that the use of a new common unit becomes unavoidable.(ibid.,
pp.437-8)
23 Horsefield (1969, Vo1.l, p.65).
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( ii ) Keynes vs. Robertson Controversy on Convertibility
Even after the Bretton Woods Conference of July 1944, Keynes persisted in his belief. It is in
the Keynes-Robertson controversy on the interpretation of the convertibility in Article VDI of the
IMF Agreement that he continued to hold the idea of the multilateral clearing between central
banks after centralizing all exchange dealings in its central bank.24
There are two provisions of convertibility in Article VDI, General Obligations of Members : frrst,
Article VDI Section 2 (a), Avoidance of Restrictions on Current Payments: secondly, Article VDI
Section 4, Convertibility of Foreign Held Balances. VDI 2 (a) provides that members should not
"impose restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions"
except for three set of circumstances: ( i ) if the scarce currency clause was invoked (Article VII
Sec.3 (b) ), ( ii ) during the transition (Article X IV Sec.2), (iii) with the approval of the Fund. vm
4 provides that members should convert overseas balances into "the currency of the member
making the request or gold", if these balances had been "recently acquired as a result of current
transactions" or whose "conversion is needed for making payments for current transactions". That
is to say, vm 2 (a) prescribes for market convertibility on the one hand and vm 4 demands offiCial
convertibility on the other hand. 25
On 31 July 1944 immediately after the Bretton Woods Conference came to an end, Dennis
Robertson sent a note to Keynes in Ottawa. In this note, Robertson stated that vm 2 (a) was "the
main and over-riding obligation" and that vm 4 was "the supplementary obligation" (CW, 26,
pp.l14-5). He went on to say that "[i]t follows ...that the clause exempting a member which has
exhausted its rights of resources to the Fund from its obligations under vm 4 (a)[( v)], is of very
doubtful value so far as the obligation under vm 4 (a) ( i ) is concerned, since...this obligation is
already implicit the master-obligation set out in vm 2 (a), which is subject to no such let-out" (ibid.,
p.116). As opposed to Robertson's interpretation about relation between vm 2 (a) and vm 4,
Keynes denied VDI 2 (a) involved an obligation of convertibility. Restated that "[c]onvertibility
only comes about, if at all, through the combination of this clause [VDI 2 (a)] with vm 4" (ibid.,
p.llS). Keynes's interpretation about the relation of this two provisions of convertibility is that a
non-resident owner of sterling balances can only deposed of it through his own central bank (VDI 2
(a) ); and that the only obligation of the British Central Bank is to buy sterling from another central
bank in exchange for the foreign exchange it desires (VDI 4 (a) ); but that the British Central Bank is
exempted from its obligation if she has exhausted its rights ofresources to the Fund(VDI 4 (b) ( v ».
24 There are many sources and some detail studies about the controversy. See Gold (1981a, b),
Pressnell (1987, pp.170-182), and Moggriclge (1992, pp.748-53).
25 Gold (1981a).
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In short, Keynes put emphasis on the official convertibility of VIII 4 on the one hand and
Robertson adhered to market convertibility of VIII 2 (a) on the other hand. A belief of Keynes is
that" [a] leading peculiarity...in I.M.F. is that, apart from VllI2, the obligations all apply as between
central banks and not as between a central bank and non-resident individuaf' (ibid., p.119,
italics mine),· whereas the assumption of Robertson is that "exchange are always maintained by
supporting the free market, instead of forcing member banks to operate through the machinery of
the Fund"(ibid., p.122, italics mine). Keynes summarized the difference of his own ideas and
Robertson's as follows:
The obligation of convertibility under VIII 4 - in my opinion the only obligation of
convertibility we undertake - is between pairs of central banks and related only to
convertibility between the currencies of the pair in question. It gives no rights to private
persons, who can only obtain convertibility through the good offers of their own central
bank. According to Professor Robertson, on the other hand, VIII 2 (a) imposes on our
Exchange Control an over..riding obligation to provide any private person on request with
any currency in the world. (ibid., p.135)
The controversy originating between Keynes and Robertson became the debate between the U.K.
and the U.S. TreasUI)' which lasted for almost one year. Keynes and almost every other British
expert wanted the restoration of the convertibility of sterling to be postponed and a comprehensive
exchange control to be maintained as long as possible. Robertson and the U.S Treasury, however,
considered that the practice for the U.K. monetary authority to centralize all exchange transactions
and not to provide the exchange to the nomesident to transfer his proceeds into his own currency
was a restriction and violation under VllI 2 (a).26 Keynes drafted the letter to H. Morgenthau, the
U.S.Secretary of the TreasUI)', and sent it to Washington under the signature of J. Anderson,
Chancellor of the Exchequer, dated on 1 February 1945.27 It took four months for Morgenthau's
reply to reach to London, in which Morgenthau stated that there was no inconsistency between
these two sections.28 The U.K.-U.S. official correspondence ended by Anderson's reply to
Morgenthau dated 28 June, in which Anderson agreed that the question of inconsistency between
these two sections would "not arise immediately" and might "in practice have little effect".29
Although the Anglo-American debate on the convertibility was concluded ambiguously, the
development of an international monetary system was vindicated Robertson' views unambiguously.
As a free exchange market has been restored since the 1950s in many member countries including
26 Gold (1981b, pp.39-40).
27 CW, 26, pp.175-7. See also Pressnell (1986., Appendix 16a).
28 CW, 26, pp.183-4. See also Pressnell (1986, Appendix 17).
29 See Pressnell (1986, Appendix 18).
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the U.K. vm: 4 has fallen into desuetude and indeed has never been invoked.3D The mechanism of
multilateralpayments under market convertibility at which VIH 2 (a) has been aimed was attained.
On the other hand, VIH 4 as well as the Keynes's leU aimed at the mechanism ofmultilateral
payments under official convertibility. The reason why Keyenes regarded VIH 4 as important is that
its provision might make multilateral payments system through the Fund itself. However,
afterwards the international monetary system developed in the direction which Keynes·could not
expected; a free exchange market was restored; the policy of members do not have to monopolized
exchange transactions; even monetary authorities as well as private parties have been able. to
participate in the free exchange market. In that sense, it may be thought that both what VIH 4 has
become a dead letter and what the Keynes plan for an leU was defeated by the White plan for an
ISF are on the same line.
N The Postwar International Economic Order in the Keynes Plan
( i ) Rule vs. Discretion in Keynes's early and later stance
The international economic order is defmed by Williamson as "a set of generally accepted
rules and conventions regarding the proper way for countries to conduct those of their economic
polices that have significant repercussions outside their own borders". And "the lack of an order is
characterized by at most weak rules and light-hearted breaches such rules as are supposed to exist,
resulting in countries adopting policies with significant international repercussions entirely at their
national discretion" .31 What is apparent in this defmition is that the international economic order is
stabilized when some rules are accepted by all countries lest any internal economic policy
conducted by one country has significant external repercussions to other countries. Contrary to this
case, an international economic order is destabilized when such rules are not accepted and every
country conducts its economic policy at its own discretion.
By the way, we could roughly place the past controversies about monetary policy on the scheme
of so-called "rule versus discretion", such as metallism versus nominalism, currency school versus
banking school, gold standard versus managed currency, fixed exchange rate versus floating
. exchange rate, and monetarism versus Keynesianism.32
The basic stance of Keynes in his early days was that monetary policy should be used to attain
internal stability and that the achievement of external stability had to be considered separately.
30 Gold (1981b, p.40).
31 Williamson (1983, p.87).
32 On the theory of rules and discretion in monetary policy, see Giovannini (1993).
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British monetary policy during interwar period had a dilemma that while a cheep money policy was
domestically required to reduce unemployment on the one hand, a dear money policy was
externally needed to fmance the deficits of balance of payments on the other. In the face of such a
"fundamental disequilibrium", the devaluation of pound sterling was the best policy choice as
Keynes made rightly diagnosis. Against British government, which were going· to make a decision
to return to the gold standard at its pre-war parity of $4.86, overvalued by at least 10 per cent, in
1925, Keynes, in A Tract on Monetary Reform (1923), proposed the managed currency system in
order to be free from the rules of game in the gold standard and to able to be discretionary control
money supply to adjust internal economic conditions. In this way, it is clear that Keynes placed
superiority on discretion over the rules.
In the second draft of the lCU, dated on 18 November 1941, however, Keynes explained his
view seemingly contradictory to his early stance mentioned above :
In only one important respect must an International Bank differ from the mode suitable to a
national bank within a closed system, namely that much more must be settled by rules and by
general principles agreed beforehand and much less by day-to-day discretion.(CW, 25,
p.45, italics mine)
In his third draft, dated on 15 December 1941, on the other hand, Keynes added the following
sentences to the above quotations:
Perhaps the most difficult question to determine is how much to decide by rules and how
much by discretion. Ifrule prevails, the liabilities attaching to membership of the system
become clear and defmite, whilst the responsibilities ofcentral management are reduced to a
minimum. ...Ifdiscretion prevails, we have to decide how far the ultimate decision can be left
to the individual members and how far to the central management. ... Ifrule prevails, the
scheme can be made more water-tight theoretically. Ifdiscretion prevails, it may work better
in practice. All this is the typical problem of any super-national authority. In myfirst draft I
was criticisedfor leaning too much to the side ofrule. In this draft this bias is in the other
direction....(ibid., p.73, italics mine)
Meltzer asserts that "[t]he proposals for the Clearing Union, in fact all of his proposals, show
Keynes as a proponent of monetary rules intended to restrict discretionary policy and reduce
uncertainty without eliminating short-term policy response. For Keynes, rules acted as general
guides to action and restrictions that provide stability and reduce uncertainty".33 He goes on to say :
"On the choice between precommitmment and unlimited discretion, Keynes was· mainly on the side
of precommitment of rules ".34 Moggridge, on the other hand, regarding the second quotation as
33 Meltzer (1988, pp.210-1).
34 ibid., pp.243-4.
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more important, said that "[i]n the case of his Clearing Union Keynes started with an emphasis on
rules/but he moved in the direction of discretion from the third draft onwards,,?5 How can we .
reconcile between Metzler's view that Keynes shifted his stance from his early vision(discretion
over rules) to his later vision (rules over· discretion) and Moggridge's view that Keynes's stance
was constantly discretion-oriented.?
(ii ) Meaning of the Symmetry in the Keynes Plan
Both KeYnes and White, of course, had to devise a set of rules in order for the postwar
international economic order. An essential rule of the Keynes plan is the "symmetry" in balance of
paYments adjustment. The problem of the asymmetry between the debtor and creditor countries
has generally been known as one of the most important themes of Keynes's international political
economy. The theme also has been long associated with the Keynes plan as opposed to the White
"'6plan.:>
It is in the fIrst draft of the ICU that his intention appears most clearly and vividly. He refers to
the fact that "in the past five hundreds years there have been only two periods of about fifty years"
(CW,25,p.21) when the adjustment mechanism of international payments can be said to have
worked. The first period was the age of Elizabeth I , in the later half of 16th century, when the
prodigious inflow of silver from new the new world brought inflation to Europe and "the strong,
creditor countries, which fIrst received silver, had to take the initiative in price adjustment"(ibid.,
p.30). The second period was the age of Victoria, in the later half of 19th century, when "the
system of international investment pivoting on London transferred the onus of adjustment from
debtor to the creditor position"(ibid., p.2l). The inflow of gold to the main creditor centers were
"immediately translated ...not into a change in prices and wages but into a change in the volume of
foreign investment by the creditors"(ibid., p.30). He concludes that" the architects of a successful
international system must be guided by these lessons. The object of the new system must be to
require the chief initiative from the creditor countries"(ibid., p.30).
By sYmmetry in the adjustment mechanism, Keynes means to put the responsibility and burden
for adjustment on the creditor countries. In the Keynes plan for an ICU, this rule is to put
expansionist pressure, namely, measures for the expansion of domestic credit and domestic demand,
on the creditor countries. The rule of the SYffiIDetry are also materialized by the provision that even
a creditor country should pay a charge on his credit balances in the ICU. Keynes regards this
provision as "a significant indication that the system looks on excessive credit balances with as
critical an eyes as on excessive debit balances"(ibid., pp.118-9, p.173).
35 Moggridge (1986,p.68). See also Moggridge (1992, p.677).
36 Flanders (1989,p.l90).
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What about changes in exchange rates? Under the Keynes plan, a deficit country whose debit
balance has exceeded a quarter of its quota on the average of at least a year shall be entitle to
depreciate its currency within 5 per cent a year "without the permission of the Governing
Board"(ibid., p.174-5). If its debit balance has exceeded a half of its quota, the Governing Board
may require depreciation of its currency. If its debit balance has exceeded three-quarters of its
quota, the Governing Board may ask the further suitable remedies. A surplus country whose credit
balance has exceeded a half of its quota on the average shall discuss with the Governing Board
about appreciation of its currency. In this way Keynes supported the adjustable peg37. On the
contrary, under the White plan, exchange rates may change only in the case of "fundamental
disequiliburium" and are required approval of the ISF, namely, a 4/5 majority of the members'
votes. In this regard, Keynes criticized that "there is a greater surrender of sovereignty under S.F.
than under C.U., and the rigidity is very excessive"(ibid., p.220). Moggridge is correct as far as
changes in exchange rates concerned when he says as mentioned above : "in the case of his
Clearing Union Keynes started with an emphasis on rules but he moved in the direction of
discretion from the third draft onwards".38
The rule of symmetry at which Keynes aimed was his fear about that U.S. discretionary policies
(especially sterilization policy) would be a heavy burden to the postwar British economic
reconstitution. Indeed it might be fair that his proposal of adjustable peg was discretion-oriented,
but it were also intended to constrain the biggest super-power in the postwar world. So we had
better place his thought not on the scheme of "rule versus discretion" but on "rule versus power".
He formulated a postwar international monetary plan not under power-based system but under rule-
based system. It is needless to say that his intention was based on his patriotism reflected by British
economic interests.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we examined the historical constraints of the Keynes plan for an ruC. First, one of
important origins of the Keynes plan was German currency scheme which aimed at a multilateral
paYments system of bilateral exchange clearing agreements. The multilateral clearing of the ICU is
not through a competitive exchange market but between central banks monopolizing all exchange
transactions. It was his early drafts of the ruc influenced by German originators that such
characteristics was distinct.
Secondly, Keynes was optimistic even after it is clear· that the realization of the ICU made
37 For the view that Keynes switched his thought of exchange rate system from crawling peg to
adjustable peg, see Williamson (1983,p.99).
38 Moggridge (1986,p.68).
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impossible. Even though its mechanism through Bancor are not realized,he thought that if
monetisation of Unitas could be agreed upon, the flame of this mechanism would be carried out in
the ISF. Also even though this proposal could not be agreed upon, he thought once more that if the
interpretation that the provision of official convertibility ofArticle VIII Section 4 is master-obligation
against that of market convertibility ofArticle VIII Section 2 (a) could be agreed upon, the core of his
ideas would remain in the IMF. All of these expectations failed to be realized because his plan for
IOU, his proposal for monetisation of Unitas in ISF and his interpretation on convertibility in the
IMF were all against the "postwar norm" of a free exchange market.
Finally, the postwar international economic order at which Keynes aimed was a rule-based
system rather than a power-based system that would permit the symmetry of the adjustment of
balance of payments between the U.S. as the largest creditor country and the rest of the world. In
order to constraint the U.S. power, he proposed, for example, the domestic expansion of the surplus
countries, paying a charge even on their credit balances in the ICU, and the discretionary change of
exchange rates; Such a rule-based system, however, was based on the U.K. national interests which
were burdened with the large sterling balances. It was his patriotic inclination to British national
interests that the multilateral clearing system in the Keynes's sense, the convertibility in his
interpretation, and the symmetrical system of the adjustment mechanism, almost all became
impractical at Bretton Woods Conference and after.
By the way, Keynes's another contribution to the postwar international economic order was the
way to deal with the large sterling balances, namely "abnormal wartime balances" in the U.K.
official term. Because British officials wanted to exclude this problem in the discussion at Bretton
Woods Conference, the Keynes plan for an ICU seemed intentionally to avoid to mention it. As the
early draft of the White plan, however, provided this problem in detail and Keynes had a high
opinion of its proposal as "an exceeding generous proposed, which would be most helpful to
us"(CW,25,p.163), the postwar currency scheme and the burden of the large sterling balances were
closely interrelated each other. Since discussing such important problem as a whole is beyond this
paper, we have to develop the theme in this paper to Keynes's contribution to the way to deal with
the sterling balances and the Anglo-American Financial Agreement.
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